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CRS-20
conflict with Russia, it would be extremely unlikely for Russian weapons to find
targets in NATO nations
The Role of Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons in U.S. National
Security Policy. The Bush Administration has claimed, as a result of its 2001
Nuclear Posture Review, the United States has reduced its reliance on nuclear
weapons by increasing the role of missile defenses and precision conventional
weapons in the U.S. deterrent posture. However, the Administration also noted, as
a result of the Nuclear Posture Review, that the United States would no longer base
the size and structure of its nuclear forces only on "the Russian threat." Instead, the
United States would acquire and maintain those capabilities that it needed to deter
and defend against the capabilities of any nation with the potential to threaten the
United States, particularly if the potential adversary possesses weapons of mass
destruction. It noted that these new, threatening capabilities could include hardened
and deeply buried targets and, possibly, bunkers holding chemical or biological
weapons. It indicated that the United States would seek to develop the capabilities
to destroy these types of facilities.
The Administration has argued that its new policy is designed to enhance
deterrence, by giving the United States more credible options in the event of a
conflict with a nation armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. This,
however presumes that the U.S. military could identify a credible scenario that
included the option of using nuclear weapons. This may not be possible in battlefield
contingencies, when U.S. forces would be vulnerable to fallout and other nuclear
effects. Further, the use of nuclear weapons to destroy underground bunkers housing
chemical or biological weapons presumes that the United States would have the
exquisite intelligence needed to locate the bunkers with the agents. Anything less
than a direct, precise attack could disperse more agent than it destroyed.
Furthermore, such bunkers could be built within an extensive network of tunnels,
using blast doors, reinforced concrete, and other shock absorbing techniques, which
would further interfere with U.S. efforts to destroy them. In addition, the
Administration's critics argue that, by tailoring its nuclear weapons to achieve
specific battlefield objectives, the United States would actually increase the
likelihood of nuclear use, rather than enhance nuclear deterrence. Further, they note
that the United States does not need new nuclear weapons to achieve its battlefield
objectives. It demonstrated in the recent war with Iraq that its conventional forces
were more than capable of defeating an enemy and overthrowing a regime, even onewith many deeply buried targets, with relative ease." Therefore, the demonstrated,
overwhelming superiority of U.S. conventional forces, rather than the hypothetical
threat of nuclear use, would serve as a more potent deterrent in future conflicts.
The Role of Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons in NATO Policy and
Alliance Strategy. Many analysts have questioned whether the United States
needs to continue to deploy nuclear weapons in Europe, more than ten years after the
collapse of the Warsaw Pact and demise of the Soviet Union. NATO policy still
views these weapons as a deterrent to any potential adversary, and they also serve as
a link among the NATO nations, with bases in several nations and shared" William Arkin, "New Nukes? No Way," Los Angeles Times, August 17, 2003.
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Woolf, Amy F. Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, report, September 9, 2004; Washington D.C.. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs6104/m1/23/: accessed May 21, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.