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CRS-23
and weapons with battlefield objectives, in particular. The Bush Administration
argues that its policy achieves this objective, by including missile defenses and
precision strike conventional weapons in its new "triad" of U.S. forces and
capabilities. Others, however, argue that the Administration's policy actually blurs
the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons, and may increase the U.S.
reliance on nuclear weapons by adding to the contingencies when the United States
would consider nuclear use. They argue, instead, that the United States should adopt
a "no first use" pledge, so that the United States would make it clear that it would not
use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. At present, the United States does
not explicitly threaten to use nuclear weapons, but it also will not rule out their use.
Supporters of the existing policy argue that this ambiguity enhances deterrence, by
keeping the possible prospect of nuclear attack in the adversary's calculations. Those
who support a "no first use" pledge argue that it would reduce the perceived value
of nuclear weapons, indicating that they serve only as a deterrent to the use of nuclear
weapons by other nations. Many believe that this change in policy would not hinder
U.S. deterrent strategy or U.S. security because they believe that the U.S. nuclear
deterrent is robust, with thousands of deployed nuclear warheads, and that U.S.
conventional forces are sufficient to address any potential or emerging threats to U.S.
security. This includes the potential need for the United States to attack hardened
and deeply buried targets, including those that might house chemical or biological
weapons. The United States could use its conventional weapons to seal off entry and
exit points and to cut off communications and ventilation,53 thereby "sealing"
chemical or biological weapons in place in their underground bunkers for the
duration of a conflict. The United States could then remove and dispose of these
weapons after winning the conflict, without risking dispersing them and creating
fallout with a nuclear attack.
Some have also argued that, if the United States and NATO reduce their reliance
on nuclear weapons, possibly even withdrawing nonstrategic nuclear weapons from
Europe, Russia might also alter its policy. Others, however, argue that Russia's
policy is only rhetorically linked to NATO policy, and with continuing concerns
about weaknesses in its conventional forces, Russia is unlikely to respond with its
own change in policy. Some also believe that changes in U.S. and NATO policy
could affect the policies of other nations with nonstrategic nuclear weapons, such as
India, Pakistan, or China, by demonstrating that the United States has reduced its
reliance on nuclear weapons. Others, however, point out that these nations have
acquired their nuclear weapons to address their own security interests, and areunlikely to alter limit their forces simply because the United States and NATO have
set an example of reductions.
Cooperative Responses. Analysts have noted that the only arms control
measures affecting nonstrategic nuclear weapons, the 1991 PNIs, do not require data
exchanges and did not establish monitoring provisions so each nation can be certain
that the other is adhering to its commitments. They also are voluntary; because they
are not incorporated in a formal treaty or agreement. Either side could reverse its
commitments at any time. Hence, the reductions under these measures may be53 Stansfield Turner, "Nukes: Can U.S. Practice What it Preaches?" Christian Science
Monitor, January 28, 2004.
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Woolf, Amy F. Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, report, September 9, 2004; Washington D.C.. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs6104/m1/26/: accessed May 21, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.