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security in storage areas and a possible lack of central control over their use when
deployed in the field. These weapons were deployed, and many remain in storage,
at remote bases close to potential battlefields and far from the central command
authority in Moscow. Further, the economic chaos in Russia during the 1990s raised
questions about the stability and reliability of the troops charged with monitoring and
securing these weapons. Hence, these issues raise concerns about the possibility that
the weapons might be lost, stolen, or sold to other nations or groups seeking nuclear
weapons.44 Russian officials acknowledged concerns about the safety and security
of these weapons in the early 1990s, and such concerns may have contributed to
acceptance of the PNIs in 1991. But Russian officials deny that they have lost
control over any of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons and they contend that the
problems have been resolved as the weapons have been withdrawn to central storage
areas.45 Further, there is not public evidence from western sources about any
episodes of lost, sold, or stolen Russian nuclear weapons.
The Role of Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons in Russia's National
Security Policy. Many analysts also argue that Russia's nonstrategic nuclear
weapons pose a risk to the United States, its allies, and others because Russia has
altered its national security concept and military strategies, increasing its reliance on
nuclear weapons. Some fear that Russia might resort to the early use of nuclear
weapons in a conflict along its periphery, which could lead to a wider conflict and
the possible involvement of troops from NATO or other neighboring countries.
possibly drawing in new NATO members. Some also believe that Russia could
threaten NATO with its nonstrategic nuclear weapons because Russia sees NATO as
a threat to its security. Russian analysts and officials have argued that NATO
enlargement, with the possible deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of
new NATO members close to Russia's borders, demonstrated how much NATO
could threaten Russia.
Others argue, however, that regardless of Russia's rhetoric, "Russia's theater
nuclear weapons are not... destabilizing." Even if modernized, these weapons will
not "give Moscow the capability to alter the strategic landscape."46 Further, many
doubt that Russian weapons, even with its new military strategy, pose a threat to
NATO or U.S. allies. They argue that Russia would only use these weapons in
response to a weak performance by its conventional forces in an ongoing conflict.
Since it would be extremely unlikely for NATO to be involved in a conventional44 "Because of their size and forward basing, they are especially vulnerable to theft and
unauthorized use." SeeWilliamC. Potter and Nikolai Sokov, "Nuclear Weapons that People
Forget," International Herald Tribune, May 31, 2000.
45 Russia's defense minister, Sergei Ivanov, has said that Russia's nuclear arsenal is safe and
militants could never steal an atomic bomb from the country. He further noted that it is a
myth that "Russian nuclear weapons are guarded badly and weakly." See "Russia Says No
Militant Threat to Nuclear Arsenal," Reuters, August 3, 2004.
46 Robert Joseph, "Nuclear Weapons and Regional Deterrence," in Larson, Jeffrey A. and
Kurt J. Klingenberger, editors, Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and
Opportunities, United States Air Force, Institute for National Security Studies, July 2001.
p. 90-92.
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Woolf, Amy F. Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, report, September 9, 2004; Washington D.C.. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs6104/m1/22/: accessed May 21, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.