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CRS-24
vulnerable to disruptions in the relationship between the United States and Russia.
Those who believe that U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons continue to
pose a threat to international security, either because of the prospects for loss of
control over Russian weapons or deliberate use by either nation, argue that the United
States and Russia should pursue further cooperative measures to address the
perceived threats from the weapons and the perceived weaknesses in the existing
controls on them. They have offered several proposals for cooperative measures.
Increase Transparency. Many analysts argue that the United States and
Russia should, at a minimum, provide each other with information about their
numbers of nonstrategic nuclear weapons and the status (i.e. deployed, stored or
awaiting dismantlement) of these weapons. Such information would might each side
to monitor the other's progress in complying with the PNIs; it could also help resolve
questions and concerns that might come up about the status of these weapons or their
vulnerability to theft or misuse. The United States and Russia have discussed
transparency measures for nuclear weapons in the past, in a separate forum in the
early 1990s, and as a part of their discussions the framework for a START III Treaty
in the late 1990s. They failed to reach agreement on either occasion. Russia, in
particular, has seemed unwilling to provide even basic information about its stockpile
of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Some in the United States have resisted as well,
arguing, in particular, that public discussions about the numbers and locations of U.S.
nuclear weapons in Europe could increase pressure on the United States to withdraw
these weapons.
Expand Threat Reduction Assistance. In the early 1990s, as a part of the
early efforts of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the United States
provided Russia with assistance in transporting nuclear weapons back to Russia from
other former Soviet republics. It has also provided Russia with assistance in
improving security at its central storage facilities for nuclear weapons. However,
much of this assistance focused on the warheads removed from strategic nuclear
weapons, rather than nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Because many nonstrategic
nuclear weapons remain at remote storage areas near former deployment areas, and
concerns remain about security at these facilities. Some analysts have suggested that
the United States could expand its threat reduction assistance to these sites, so that
it could build confidence in the safety and security of these weapons. Others,
however, argue that the United States should only provide assistance at sites that
support the retirement or elimination of nuclear warheads and should not providefunding for sites that can support the weapons' continued deployment. Some have
also questioned whether Russia would accept assistance at these sites, particularly if
it were not permitted reciprocal access to U.S. weapons storage sites. Russia did,
however, recently conduct an exercise, with NATO observers and CTR funding, to
explore the vulnerability of its nuclear weapons storage sites to incursions and theft.
Negotiate a Formal Treaty. Several analysts have suggested that the United
States and Russia negotiate a formal treaty to both codify the measures outlined in
the PNIs and to put further limits and restrictions on each nation's nonstrategic
nuclear weapons. Such an agreement could mandate further reduction in deployed
weapons, including U.S. weapons in Europe, and could result in both nations
reducing their reliance on these weapons in their military strategies. Some analysts
have also argued that this treaty could be multilateral, to include nations such as
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Woolf, Amy F. Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, report, September 9, 2004; Washington D.C.. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs6104/m1/27/: accessed May 21, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.