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China, India, and Pakistan, rather than bilateral, thus introducing arms control limits
to the forces of other nations with nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
However, as have been noted throughout this report, the two sides would likely
find it difficult to agree on a definition of which weapons counted as nonstrategic
nuclear weapons, particularly if either nation begins to deploy warheads designed to
achieve battlefield objectives on long-range or strategic delivery vehicles. The issue
would be further complicated by the fact that both the United States and Russia hold
many of these warheads in storage, and some could conceivably return to deployment
in a relatively short amount of time. To address these problems, some analysts have
suggested that the arms control regime count and limit all warheads - stored and
deployed, strategic and nonstrategic, etc. This type of agreement would allow each
side to determine, for itself, the size and mix of its deployed forces, within the limits
on total warheads.4 Critics argue that such limits would be extremely difficult to
define and monitor, making it difficult to verify compliance with a warhead-control
treaty. They also note that the lack of symmetry between U.S. and Russian forces
would make it extremely difficult to find common definitions and limits that
addressed each nations' concerns. In particular, because Russia views U.S. NATO
weapons as a threat to its security, it could insist on the complete removal of these
weapons in exchange for less comprehensive limits on the far greater numbers of
Russian forces.5 Further, the other nations with nonstrategic nuclear weapons seem
unlikely, at this time, to be willing to join a regime that would limit their capabilities.
Analysts recognize that negotiating such an agreement would be complex and
time-consuming. But it suffers from still another problem. Neither the Russian nor
U.S. governments have expressed any interest in pursuing this path. Russian officials
have denied that their weapons pose a safety and security problem, and they still
consider these weapons essential to Russian military strategy and national security.
The Bush Administration has also shown no interest in negotiating further limits on
U.S. nuclear warheads or weapons. To the contrary, in the 2002 Strategic Offensive
Reductions Treaty (Moscow Treaty), the United States indicated that it would only
count "operationally deployed" strategic nuclear warheads under the limits in the
Treaty. This metric counts fewer warheads than the START Treaty, and far fewer
than a metric that would include stored and deployed strategic and nonstrategic
nuclear warheads. The Bush Administration has resisted more confining arms
control measures, arguing that the United States must maintain the flexibility to
adjust its forces and redeploy warheads to respond to changes in the internationalsecurity environment.
4 "The only way to get a real handle on NSNF security, and the relationship of these
weapons to strategic arms control and the real military threats they pose (while maintaining
some capability) is the warhead control route." See Joseph F. Pilat, "Controlling
Nonstrategic Nuclear Forces," in Larson, Jeffrey A. and Kurt J. Klingenberger, editors,
Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities, United States
Air Force, Institute for National Security Studies, July 2001, p. 243.
5 Robert Gromoll and Dunbar Lockwood, "Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons: Defining U.S.
Objectives," in Larson, Jeffrey A. and Kurt J. Klingenberger, editors. Controlling Non-
Strategic Nuclear Weapons. Obstacles and Opportunities, United States Air Force, Institute
for National Security Studies, July 2001, p. 82.
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Woolf, Amy F. Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, report, September 9, 2004; Washington D.C.. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs6104/m1/28/: accessed May 21, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.