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as either "strategic" or "nonstrategic;" such a designation would likely depend on the
intended target for the weapon in the event of a conflict. The Administration has also
funded research into Advanced Concepts for nuclear weapons. This program has not
yet pursued any particular research or identified any new types of weapons for further
study, but many of the Administration's critics believe it might be used to develop
new types of "low yield" nuclear weapons.
The Administration and others who support research into a new earth-penetrator
weapon argue that, by burrowing underground before exploding, these weapons
could not achieve a higher probability of destroying fortified targets, but might also
do so with lower collateral damage by exploding deeply underground. According to
the Administration, these features would increase their credibility as a deterrent
weapon. Some have also argued that new types of nuclear weapons, such as low
precision, low-yield weapons, could be used to attack and destroy stocks of chemical
or biological weapons in their bunkers, again, with lower collateral damage than the
larger, existing types of nuclear weapons. These programs' critics argue that these
weapons, with their reduced collateral damage, might be more "useable" than
existing nuclear weapons, and, therefore, increase the likelihood that the United
States would resort to nuclear weapons during a conflict. They note that, even with
their earth-penetrating capabilities, these weapons would produce horrific damage
and destruction. Further, they argue that any U.S. attempt to make nuclear weapons
appear more "useable" or to have greater military utility, is likely to undermine U.S.
efforts to convince other nations not to acquire their own nuclear weapons.
The targets for these new types of weapons could be "strategic" in nature,
supporting the military or political infrastructure needed to pursue a conflict, or they
could be more "tactical" in nature, supporting an adversary's troops or battlefield
formations. Therefore, the question of whether these weapons would be strategic or
nonstrategic would depend on future war plans and targeting options. Yet with the
sharp decline in the numbers and types of delivery vehicles for nonstrategic
warheads, these weapons might be delivered by strategic delivery vehicles, such as
ballistic missiles or bombers, regardless of their targeting objective. Hence, the U.S.
plans for the development of new types of nuclear weapons highlight the
complexities discussed above in defining and identifying nonstrategic nuclear
weapons because, in future scenarios, it may be difficult to tell what a weapon is
intended to attack by the range of its delivery vehicle or the yield of its warhead.Russian Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War
Strategy and Doctrine. Russia has altered and adjusted the Soviet nuclear
strategy to meet its new circumstances in a post-Cold War world. It explicitly
rejected the Soviet Union's no-first use pledge in 1993, indicating that it viewed
nuclear weapons as a central feature in its military and security strategies. However,
Russia did not maintain the Soviet Union's view of the need for nuclear weapons to
conduct surprise attacks or preemptive attacks. Instead, it seems to view these
weapons as more defensive in nature, as a deterrent to conventional or nuclear attack
and as a means to retaliate and defend itself if an attack were to occur.
Russia revised its national security and military strategy several times during the
1990s, with each successive version appearing to place a greater reliance on nuclear
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Woolf, Amy F. Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, report, September 9, 2004; Washington D.C.. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs6104/m1/17/: accessed May 21, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.