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CRS-2
upheaval in that nation. It also allowed the United States to alter its forces in
response to easing tensions and the changing international security environment.
Consequently, for many in the general public, these initiatives appeared to address
and solve the problems associated with nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Moreover,
although the United States and Russia included these weapons in some of their arms
control discussions, most of their arms control efforts during the rest of that decade
focused on implementing the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and
negotiating deeper reductions in strategic nuclear weapons.
The lack of public attention did not, however, reflect a total absence of
questions or concerns about nonstrategic nuclear weapons. In 1997, President
Clinton and Russia's President Boris Yeltsin signed a framework agreement that
stated they would address measures related to nonstrategic nuclear weapons in a
potential START III Treaty. Further, during the 1990s, outside analysts, officials in
the U.S. government, and many Members of Congress raised continuing questions
about the safety and security of Russia's remaining nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
Congress also sought a more detailed accounting of Russia's weapons in legislation
passed in the late 1990s. Analysts have also questioned the role that these weapons
might play in Russia's evolving national security strategy, the rationale for their
continued deployment in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and their relationship to U.S.
nuclear nonproliferation policy. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 also
reminded people of the catastrophic consequences that might ensue if terrorists were
to acquire and use nuclear weapons, with continuing attention focused on the
potentially insecure stock of Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Many analysts
outside government have argued that the United States and Russia should pursue a
formal arms control treaty, possibly including other nuclear weapons states, to reduce
and eliminate these weapons.
The Bush Administration has not, however, adopted a policy of reducing or
eliminating nonstrategic nuclear weapons. When it announced the results of its
nuclear posture review in early 2002, it did not outline any changes to the U.S.
deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons at bases in Europe; it stated that NATO
would address the future of those weapons. It also did not discuss these weapons
with Russia during arms control negotiations in 2002. Instead, the Strategic
Offensive Reductions Treaty (Moscow Treaty) signed in May 2003 limits only the
number of operationally deployed warheads on strategic nuclear weapons. Further,
the Bush Administration has stated that the United States will study whether it canmodify an existing nuclear weapon to improve its capability as a "robust nuclear
earth penetrator" - a weapon that could attack and destroy hardened and deeply
buried targets - and will pursue research into advanced concepts for nuclear
weapons.
The Bush Administration has argued that a new earth penetrating nuclear
weapon will enhance the U.S. nuclear deterrent and improve U.S. security by
improving the U.S. ability to hold at risk key assets of emerging adversaries. Many
analysts outside government, and some Members of Congress, have argued, however
that the Bush Administration's policies not only ignore the potential risks from
Russia's nonstrategic nuclear weapons, but will also "ignite a new arms race" by
raising the perceived utility of nuclear weapons. This report will review the debate
over the implications of the Administration's policy in a later section. It is worth
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Woolf, Amy F. Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, report, September 9, 2004; Washington D.C.. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs6104/m1/5/: accessed May 21, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.