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CRS-5
inside the other nation's territory. But some early Soviet submarine-launched
ballistic missiles had relatively short (i.e. 500 mile) ranges, and the submarines
patrolled close to U.S. shores to ensure that the weapons could reach their strategic
targets. Conversely, in the 1980s the United States considered sea-launched cruise
missiles (SLCMs) deployed on submarines or surface ships to be nonstrategic nuclear
weapons. But, if these vessels were deployed close to Soviet borders, these weapons
could have destroyed many of the same targets as U.S. strategic nuclear weapons.
Similarly, U.S. intermediate-range missiles that were deployed in Europe, which
were considered nonstrategic by the United States, could reach central, strategic
targets in the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, some weapons that had the range to reach "strategic" targets on
the territory of the other nations could also deliver tactical nuclear weapons in
support of battlefield or tactical operations. Soviet bombers could be equipped with
nuclear-armed anti-ship missiles; U.S. bombers could also carry anti-ship weapons
and nuclear mines. Hence, the range of the delivery vehicle does not always correlate
with the types of targets or objectives associated with the warhead carried on that
system. This relationship between range and mission has become even more clouded
since the end of the Cold War because the United States and Russia have retired
many of the shorter and medium-range delivery systems considered to be
nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Further, both nations may develop the capability to
use their longer-range "strategic" systems to deliver warheads to a full range of
strategic and tactical targets, even if longstanding traditions and arms control
definitions weigh against this change.
Definition by yield of warheads. During the Cold War, the longer-range
strategic delivery vehicles also tended to carry warheads with greater yields, or
destructive power, than nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Smaller warheads were better
suited to nonstrategic weapons because they sought to achieve more limited, discrete
objectives on the battlefield than did the larger, strategic nuclear weapons. But this
distinction has also dissolved in more modern systems. Many U.S. and Russian
heavy bombers can carry weapons of lower yields, and, as accuracies improved for
bombs and missiles, warheads with lower yields could achieve the same expected
level of destruction that had required larger warheads in early generations of strategic
weapons systems.
Definition by Exclusion. The observable capabilities that allowed analyststo distinguish between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons during the Cold
War have not always been precise, and may not prove to be relevant or appropriate
in the future. On the other hand, the "strategic" weapons identified by these
capabilities - ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers - are the only systems covered
by the limits in strategic offensive arms control agreements - the SALT agreements
signed in the 1970s, the START agreements signed in the 1990s, and the Moscow
Treaty in signed in 2002. Consequently, an "easy" dividing line is one that would
consider all weapons not covered by strategic arms control treaties as nonstrategic
nuclear weapons. This report takes this approach when reviewing the history of U.S.
and Soviet/Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and in some cases when discussingremaining stocks of nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
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Woolf, Amy F. Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, report, September 9, 2004; Washington D.C.. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs6104/m1/8/: accessed May 21, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.