Two types of hypothetical reactor catastrophe are considered. In the first of these, the Boiling Accident,'' it is assumed that a fraction of the radioactive material in a reactor is released to the atmosphere at a steady rate over a period of hours. In the second, the Puff Accident,'' it is assumed that the release of the radioactive material takes place instantaneously.'' The following concepts are used as measures of the hazard existing outside the controlled plant area. Danger Distance,'' defined as that distance beyond which the fission product cloud becomes so dilute that it cannot cause death; Probabiiity of …
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Two types of hypothetical reactor catastrophe are considered. In the first of these, the Boiling Accident,'' it is assumed that a fraction of the radioactive material in a reactor is released to the atmosphere at a steady rate over a period of hours. In the second, the Puff Accident,'' it is assumed that the release of the radioactive material takes place instantaneously.'' The following concepts are used as measures of the hazard existing outside the controlled plant area. Danger Distance,'' defined as that distance beyond which the fission product cloud becomes so dilute that it cannot cause death; Probabiiity of Death per Capita per Accident,'' which is a measure of the hazard to any individual; and Expectation Number of Deaths per Accident.'' which is a statistical measure of the hazard to the entire off-site populace. Three mechanisms for each type of catastrophe were considered: direct irradiation from the fission product cloud, inhalation of the air in the cloud, and rainout from the cloud followed by irradiation from the ground. Failout is not considered. for it requires that a very energetic explosion be assumed. It is concluded that the size of the plant should be set by the hazard of irradiation from the low- lying poison cloud produced in the boiling accident. A formula is proposed that permits the calculation of the controiled area that should exist around any reactor. Inversion and average meteoroiogy are analyzed in terms of their effect on off-site hazard. The same theory, utilizing the concepts of the probabiiity of death and the expectation number of deaths, is useful in estimating the hazard in the event a tank of H/sub 2/S, SO/sub 2/. or Cl ruptures. releasing to the atmosphere great quantities of gaseous poison. This problem is treated briefly at the end of the report. It is estimated that the escape of 1.4 million pounds of unignited hydrogen sulfide over a period of half an hour is equivalent in hazard to a 1000-Mw reactor that runs away and releases a cloud of fission products in which tee decay heat is 2 Mw. (auth)
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Menegus, R. L. & Ring, H. F.Accidental Dispersion of Reactor Poisons and the Controlled Distance Required,
report,
March 1, 1958;
United States.
(https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1021705/:
accessed May 30, 2024),
University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu;
crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.